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AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL’S EMPTY PROMISES: 
DECRIMINALIZATION, PROSTITUTED WOMEN,  
AND SEX TRAFFICKING  
Darren Geist 
Princeton University 
 
ABSTRACT 
Through a close examination of Amnesty International’s (Amnesty) own arguments and 
sources, this paper demonstrates that Amnesty’s proposal to decriminalize prostitution or 
“sex work” will harm those it claims to help. It concludes that the best available evidence 
indicates that decriminalization of prostitution would: increase sex trafficking, leave 
prostituted women or “sex workers” more vulnerable to violence, and reduce access to 
healthcare, protection, and services. Prostituted women primarily enter the industry at a 
young age, often suffering from a history of sexual and physical abuse, coming from 
marginalized and vulnerable communities, and driven by emotional and economic 
desperation. It is in this context that prostituted women “consent” to sell themselves in 
the extremely risky and dangerous sex industry. But instead of helping victims of sexual 
exploitation, Amnesty’s proposal will mostly benefit their abusers—the mostly male 
consumers and organizers of the sex industry. Amnesty reaches its flawed conclusion by 
consistently misreading the evidence, engaging in selective skepticism, and ignoring the 
troubling legal and practical implications of its own policy. Amnesty rejects decades of 
scholarly research on the basis of few sources—in one case from close to half a century 
ago—and sometimes misreads the reports they rely on. Amnesty consulted primarily with 
those most likely to support its position—the “sex workers”—rather than the sex 
trafficking victims, adult survivors of prostitution and the child victims of commercial 
sexual exploitation who are the most harmed by the sex industry. 
KEYWORDS 
Prostitution, sex work, sex workers, sex trafficking human trafficking, trafficking, 
exploitation, violence against women 
 
Prostitution is not a victimless crime; it is a brutal form of sexual vio-
lence. —Letter signed by 177 sex trafficking survivors (Equality Now, 
2013) 
N MARCH 26, 2016, Amnesty International (Amnesty) released its final 
policy recommendation to decriminalize all prostitution and claimed it 
was defending the human rights of “sex workers” (Amnesty International, 
2016a). This paper will evaluate Amnesty’s proposal, arguments, and supporting 
evidence. It contends that Amnesty’s recommendations would make prostituted 
women and victims of sex trafficking more vulnerable to abuse and violence, 
O 
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 while handing a huge victory to their abusers. This paper also argues that Amnes-
ty consistently misreads the evidence, engages in selective skepticism, and ig-
nores the troubling implications of its own policy. Decriminalizing prostitution 
will increase human trafficking, leave prostitutes even more susceptible to exploi-
tation, and encourage a degrading and violent industry. Amnesty’s policy will not 
help “sex workers” or victims of sex trafficking, but it will help the mostly male 
pimps and johns exploiting them.  
This paper will demonstrate the weakness of Amnesty’s main arguments for 
decriminalization, and methodological problems that led Amnesty to this conclu-
sion. The first section focuses on comparing Amnesty’s semantics and rhetoric to 
the actual legal and policy implications of its proposal. The second section ex-
plores the connection between sex trafficking and prostitution, examines Amnes-
ty’s evidence for denying a link between them, and concludes by arguing that de-
criminalization will likely increase sex trafficking. The third section examines 
what it means to “consent” to prostitution by looking at the factors for entry and 
at the nature of the sex industry. It critically considers Amnesty’s research on a 
variety of topics such as average age of entry and the risks associated with prosti-
tution. The final section contends that—contrary to Amnesty’s view—
decriminalization will undermine the safety and health of prostitutes or “sex 
workers.” The conclusion addresses some of the collateral results of decriminali-
zation on rape culture and violence against women. 
 
RHETORIC AND REALITY:  
THE POLICY AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DECRIMINALIZATION 
 
Amnesty International’s proposal recommends “the decriminalization of all 
aspects of consensual adult sex” (Murphy, 2015). This includes the sale of sex by 
“sex workers” and the “repeal (of) those (laws) which make the buying of sex 
from consenting adults or the organization of sex work . . . a criminal offense” 
(Amnesty International, 2016a, p. 2). In other words, being a “john” or a “pimp” 
would no longer be a criminal offense, but there could be charges for other relat-
ed offenses. Amnesty considers the term “sex worker” to apply only to “consent-
ing adults” of at least 18 years of age (Amnesty International, 2016a, p. 3-4; Am-
nesty International, 2016b, p. 3-4). On his or her eighteenth birthday, a boy or 
girl counts as a consenting adult for the purpose of selling sex. Amnesty's pro-
posal of decriminalization is distinct from legalization, which would involve for-
mal regulation the sex industry and “introduction of laws and policies specific to 
sex work” (Amnesty International, 2015) (emphasis in original). 
Amnesty claims that its recommendations are about protecting and advocat-
ing for “the human rights of sex workers,” but it is the men—the consumers and 
organizers of sex—who will benefit most.  “Sex work” is not gender-neutral. The 
vast majority of “sex workers” are women. Practically all of the consumers (the 
johns) and the organizers of the sale of sex (the pimps) are men. Amnesty's pro-
posal would establish the legal right of men to buy or rent women's bodies for 
sexual acts, and the legal right of men to sell or rent women's bodies to other men 
for sexual acts.  
In fact, this will be the primary effect of Amnesty's proposal, for the vast ma-
jority of people in the sex industry are the consumers, the johns (Moran, 2013). 
The level of consumer participation varies from country to country—from as high 
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 as 60 to 75 percent in some Southeast Asian countries (Moran, 2013) to 10 per-
cent in Britain, 18 percent in Germany (Raymond, 2004), and 17 to 55 percent in 
Italy (Raymond, 2004; Smith, 2003). In the United States, an estimated 15–20 
percent of men have paid for sex (ABT Associates Inc., 2008). In contrast, the 
number of “female sex workers” ranged between 0.2 percent and 2.6 percent in 
Asia, 0.1 percent and 1.4 percent in West Europe (Vandepitte et al, 2006), and 
under 1 percent in the United States (Lubin, 2012). As Rachel Moran explained, 
“Prostitution is a thoroughly male-dominated trade” (Moran, 2013, p. 193). 
Amnesty denies that its policy helps pimps or establishes a right to buy sex 
(Amnesty International, 2015), but that is the essence of the proposal. Many sup-
porters of prostitution law reform already oppose criminalizing the sale of sex 
because it further victimizes the victims of commercial sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation. The Nordic model, for instance, decriminalizes the sale of sex: but it 
also criminalizes the purchase and organizing of prostitution as a way to reduce 
demand, and protect the victims of prostitution and trafficking. Other advocates 
have considered more small-scale reforms within the existing law-enforcement 
model, such as safe harbors laws for prostituted children, expansion of john 
schools,1 special trafficking courts, and additional police training. But Amnesty 
criticizes the Nordic model and others precisely because it believes that the pur-
chase and organizing of sex must be decriminalized as well. In fact, Amnesty’s 
decriminalization policy is unique precisely because it creates a legal right for 
men to buy and sell women’s bodies for sexual services. And throughout its con-
sultations and draft policies, Amnesty expressed sympathy for men purchasing 
and arranging the sale of women’s bodies (Neuwirth, 2014). Amnesty’s proposal 
is not entirely or even mostly about the “sex workers” it claims to defend. 
On its face, Amnesty’s policy recommendation that “sex work” be treated as 
any other form of employment also has many troubling implications. Here are 
four quick examples. First, in most service industries, people cannot discriminate 
against their customers based on race, gender, religion, and sexual orientation 
(ACLU, 2012). Under Amnesty’s policy, “sex workers” would legally be obligated 
to have sex with certain customers, stripping them of their ability to choose their 
“clients.” Second, in many welfare systems, people have to prove that they have 
attempted to find employment prior to qualifying for aid. Amnesty’s proposal 
would open the door for requirements that women attempt to sell themselves for 
“sex” before receiving welfare benefits. This issue has already been raised in 
Germany (UPI, 2005; Moran, 2013, p. 213-214).2 Fortunately, the Budessozialge-
richt (Federal Social Court of Germany) decided in 2009 that women were not 
obligated to have sex with men. But Germany’s decision was under a “legaliza-
tion” framework, not Amnesty’s decriminalization model, which allows no special 
exceptions or treatment of “sex work.” Third, in most jobs, when someone ob-
tains services through unlawful means (such as deception or threats), it is treated 
as “theft of services.” Because Amnesty claims that “sex work” should be treated 
like other forms of employment, this raises the prospect that if a john rapes a “sex 
worker,” he would be guilty of theft of services rather than rape. Amnesty was 
                                                        
1 John schools are education programs for someone—almost exclusively men—arrested for solicit-
ing illegal commercial sex. The Johns are diverted into these programs to learn about the realities 
of prostitution, risks of STDs, and other factors with the goal of dissuading them from soliciting 
commercial sex in the future. 
2 Hamburg lawyer Mechthild Garweg explained, “There is now nothing in the law to stop women 
being sent into the sex industry… The new regulations say that working in the sex industry is not 
immoral any more, and so jobs cannot be turned down without a risk to benefits” (UPI, 2005). 
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 clearly aware of this concern. In the Final Policy, it explicitly states that consent 
can be withdrawn at any time, and that if consent is withdrawn, then it is still 
rape (Amnesty International, 2016a, p. 15). Unfortunately, Amnesty does not ex-
plain how this can be squared with the essence of its policy that “sex work” is the 
same as other forms of “work” and that there should be no special “legalization” 
of “sex work.” Further, the fact that Amnesty has to clarify that rape will still be 
treated as a rape is an indication of how morally problematic and dangerous its 
policy is. Fourth, normally, when there is a contract for services, breaching that 
contract makes someone liable for monetary damages. 3  Amnesty’s proposal 
would require a woman who changes her mind about having sex with a john to 
pay damages to him. 
Further, because Amnesty’s policy does not recommend special regulations of 
“consensual” sexual arrangements, it would permit violent or rough sexual activi-
ty that could include beatings, torture, cutting, and burning. The testimony of 
“sex workers,” the BDSM industry,4 and the prevalence of domestic violence and 
violence against women indicate that there may be a high demand for such ar-
rangements. Amnesty may not want to condone violence against women, but 
Amnesty’s policy opens to the door for it. Nor does Amnesty’s recommendation 
give any basis for laws requiring birth control, including condoms, or methods for 
limiting STDs. 
This is the promise of Amnesty’s human rights approach: Women will be 
compelled and pressured, with a green light from the state, to have sex with men. 
Amnesty’s policy employs empty rhetoric of consent and bodily autonomy, while 
paving the way for “sex workers” to be stripped of the choice to enter the industry 
and the ability to pick their “clients.” This proposal would leave them vulnerable 
to even more sexual exploitation. Amnesty would claim that the preceding is not 
the intent of its policy; but despite that, it is undeniably the result of it.  
The following sections will detail other results of a “human rights” policy that 
protects the rights of men to buy and sell women’s bodies for sex. In the following 
sections, instead of referring to “sex work” or “sex workers,” I will use the terms 
prostitution and prostituted women. This is not to deny that other people can al-
so be prostituted, but women are by far still the most commonly sold in the sex 
industry. “Sex work” and “sex workers” will not be used because sex is not and 
should not be treated as a form of work like any other, as will be argued in the 
section “The Myth of Consent.” 
 
                                                        
3 Courts have ruled that specific performance for breach of contract is not allowed under the 13th 
Amendment (Oman, 2009). Specific performance is when the court orders the breaching party to 
fulfill the terms of the contract, such as ordering a “sex worker” to have sex with her client. 
4 BDSM is often a gateway into human trafficking. In a case prosecuted by Pamela Chen, “Jodi” 
entered into a consensual BDSM relationship with Marcus that quickly devolved into human traf-
ficking. Among other abuses, the victim has “slave” carved into her chest with a knife, the letter “G” 
branded onto her buttocks with a coat hanger, and a whiffle ball put into her mouth and lips closed 
with surgical needles. She was subject to regular beatings, torture, and rape, and Marcus attempted 
to sew her vagina shut with a sewing needle and thread (U.S. v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp.2d 289 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007)). 
4
Dignity: A Journal on Sexual Exploitation and Violence, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/dignity/vol1/iss1/6
DOI: 10.23860/dignity.2016.01.01.06
 SEX TRAFFICKING AND PROSTITUTION:  
TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN 
 
Amnesty’s proposal attempts to delink sex trafficking and prostitution (Am-
nesty International 2016a; Amnesty International 2016b). Amnesty does this in 
order to argue that decriminalization will not result in increased sex trafficking, 
which could justify laws against prostitution. Even if prostitution were treated as 
“work,” the collateral effects of decriminalization might be seen as too high. Yet 
this section will show that Amnesty relies on unreliable and misleading argu-
ments, and ignores the weight of the evidence that shows sex trafficking and 
prostitution to be closely linked. 
The market for sex trafficking and prostitution is fundamentally the same. It 
is a market for the sale of sex, and as a consequence, they both react to the same 
dynamics of supply and demand. The decriminalization or legalization of prosti-
tution drastically increases demand for sex due to the reduced stigma of purchas-
ing sex and the elimination of legal deterrents. This increase in demand can be 
met three ways. First, it can be met with legal prostitution; this is sometimes 
called the “substitution effect,” where legal, consensual prostitutes substitute for 
illegal prostitution. Second, sex traffickers can step in and meet the excess de-
mand; this is sometimes referred to as the “scale effect.” Third, if the demand 
drives the price of purchase up sufficiently, supply and demand can reach equi-
librium; but this scenario requires an enforcement model efficient enough to pre-
vent sex trafficking and ensure a properly functioning market. 
In practice, the most common response to increased demand is an increase in 
sex trafficking. This is because when prostitution is decriminalized or legalized, 
the increase in demand for sex far outstrips the increase in consensual supply. 
Pimps turn to sex trafficking to meet that gap between supply and demand. De-
criminalization also reduces the risk to pimps and sex traffickers,5 while increas-
ing the possible rewards. In the Netherlands, one of the first countries to experi-
ment with legalization and decriminalization, there has been a marked increase 
in sex trafficking (Working Group, 2004; Rudder, 2011; Cho et al, 2013). Seeking 
a solution, the De Wallen council recommended reducing the number of brothels, 
noting that monitoring and investigating sex trafficking may even be harder in 
the legalized prostitution sector (Dutch News, 2011; Mees, 2009). Some police 
experts estimate that 50 to 90 percent of prostitutes in the red light district were 
forced into prostitution (Mees, 2009). According to an International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO) study comparing the decriminalization model in Denmark and 
                                                        
5 The risk for sex traffickers will be reduced because it will be easier to operate by hiding victims in 
plain sight. Already many criminal organizations and gangs are moving to sex trafficking because it 
is a notoriously hard crime to investigate and prosecute. In contrast to drugs and guns, when a man 
is seen with a women or child, there is no evidence of a crime; police usually need testimony from 
traumatized individuals, who are terrified of the traffickers and often distrustful of police. Decrimi-
nalizing prostitution would make these investigations harder. Now, even when a man is selling a 
young woman for sex, there is no evidence of a crime, and no basis for the police to investigate fur-
ther. Further, under Amnesty’s open market framework, even physical injuries are not enough to 
raise police suspicions, and even if they do, they might be considered first as a contract dispute ra-
ther than an issue of sex trafficking or abuse. Some advocates of the law enforcement model recog-
nize that prostituted women are victims of commercial sex abuse, but believe that criminal laws are 
necessary to provide avenues for government and chance to separate prostituted women from their 
exploiters. The Nordic model, instead, only criminalizes the purchase of sex rather than its sale, but 
it still uses the criminal aspect as an opportunity for intervention.  
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 the Nordic model in neighboring Sweden, the number of trafficking victims in 
Denmark is four times that of Sweden, even though Sweden's population is about 
40 percent larger than Denmark’s and even though the number of legal prosti-
tutes in Denmark is also three to four times larger than in Sweden (Dailova-
Trainor & Belser, 2006). Germany’s population is about 10 times as large as Swe-
den’s, but it has 69 times as many prostitutes and an estimated 62 times as many 
trafficking victims (Dailova-Trainor & Belser, 2006). A study in 2005 showed that 
trafficking in Germany declined gradually through 2001 and then started to in-
crease after the decriminalization of prostitution of 2002 (Di Nocala et al, 2005). 
And this makes sense. Demand for buying sex is much more elastic than supply 
for the sale of sex, which creates a huge opening for sex traffickers to make mon-
ey—and they take advantage of it. While Sweden has seen a marked decline in 
demand (from around 14 percent to 7.5 percent of the male population), Den-
mark has seen an over 40 percent increase (Dailova-Trainor & Belser, 2006). In 
Norway, demand for sex dropped 20-25 percent after the introduction of the 
Nordic model (Rasmussen et al, 2014).  
The conclusions from these case studies are further backed by three studies 
involving global data sets and theoretical analysis. One study of 150 countries by 
Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer found that “[t]he scale effect of legalized prostitution 
leads to an expansion of the prostitution market, and increased human traffick-
ing, while the substitution effect reduces demand for trafficked women as legal 
prostitutes are favored over trafficked ones. . .  On average, countries where pros-
titution is legal experience larger reported human trafficking inflows” (Cho et al, 
2013, p. 1).6 In another study, Jakobsson and Kotsadam concluded, “Using two 
recent sources of European cross country data sets we show that trafficking of 
persons for commercial sexual exploitation . . . is least prevalent in countries 
where prostitution is illegal, most prevalent in countries where prostitution is le-
galized, and in between in those countries where prostitution is legal but procur-
ing illegal. . . . [T]he results suggest that criminalizing procuring, or going further 
and criminalizing buying and/or selling sex, may reduce the amount of trafficking 
to a country” (Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2013, p. 1). A third theoretical study, by 
Lee and Persson, concluded that the Nordic model was more effective at reducing 
trafficking than the Dutch model of decriminalization (Lee & Persson, 2013). It 
concluded that the Dutch model had the same effect on trafficking as the tradi-
tional model of complete criminalization, which has a weak effect of increasing 
trafficking. They advocated for a hybrid of the Swedish and Dutch model (Lee & 
Persson, 2013). 
Amnesty’s proposal claims that criminalization (of either demand or supply 
side) does not reduce trafficking, and it has two supporting citations (Amnesty 
International, 2016b, p. 46). The first citation is to a three-paragraph editorial in 
The Lancet that devotes one sentence to the issue at hand (Lancet, 2015). The 
other citation was to a submission by Anti-Slavery International (ASI) to the 
Committee for Justice of the Northern Ireland Assembly, in which ASI claimed it 
                                                        
6 According to Amnesty, Weitzer “convincingly rebutted” the methodology of Cho et al. (Amnesty, 
2016b, p. 47). One of Weitzer’s critiques was that the Cho et al study looked at UNODC numbers on 
human trafficking rather than just sex trafficking. He argued that there is no reason that prostitu-
tion should be linked to labor trafficking (Weitzer, 2014, p. 6-24). In doing so, Weitzer effectively 
concedes that there is a reason that prostitution and sex trafficking could be related because it is 
logically the same market. Further, there often is a link between labor and sex trafficking since they 
rely on similar criminal networks, and an atmosphere conducive to criminal behavior. The close 
connection between prostitution and sex trafficking then also links it to labor trafficking. 
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 did not have enough evidence that criminalization reduced human trafficking 
(Anti-Slavery International, 2014). But of course this is different from saying that 
their evidence proves that criminalization does not reduce trafficking. Amnesty 
also uses the same ASI citation to support its claim that decriminalization does 
not increase human trafficking (Amnesty International, 2016b, p. 46). But Am-
nesty failed to mention the final report produced after ASI’s submission: The 
Committee For Justice reviewed all the evidence, conducted in-country visits, 
and then concluded that it “strongly believed that there is a clear link between 
human trafficking and the demand for sexual services. Criminalising the pur-
chase of such services would curtail demand and therefore lessen the incentives 
for human trafficking thus reducing it” (Committee for Justice, 2015, p. 28) (em-
phasis added). The Committee concluded that Nordic model in Sweden has re-
duced demand for sexual services and tackled human trafficking (Committee for 
Justice, 2015, p. 28). In short, Amnesty cites ASI’s submission, but it ignores the 
Committee’s conclusions that human trafficking and prostitution are linked and 
that the Nordic model was the most successful in reducing trafficking. 
Amnesty’s only remaining piece of evidence is a German Federal Police Re-
port that found the number of “identified” human trafficking cases had decreased 
(Amnesty International, 2016b, p. 47). But, as Amnesty points out, Germany has 
a legalization model, which Amnesty has specifically rejected (Amnesty Interna-
tional, 2016b, p. 47). Further, those statistics are widely understood to understate 
the amount of trafficking in Germany (Spiegel, 2013; Follmar-Otto & Rabe, 
2009). This may be because the police put less emphasis on trafficking investiga-
tions as result of legalizing prostitution (Follmar-Otto & Rabe, 2009). Helmut 
Sporer, Detective Chief Superintendent of the Crimes Squad in Augsburg, Ger-
many, noted that around 80 percent of the “sex workers” in Germany are immi-
grants, primarily from new EU member states known to be major trafficking 
routes. And Sporer continued, “90 percent of these women have not . . . freely 
chosen prostitution, they are subjected to various forms of pressure” (Speak, 
2013). Belatedly, Germany has begun to understand the extent of its trafficking 
problem and to attempt reforms of its prostitution laws (Speak, 2013).  
Amnesty has adopted a double standard in its proposal: Time and again, it 
demands absolute certainty for contrary positions (something impossible in so-
cial science), but it trusts anything that supports its own case. At times, Amnesty 
misreads and twists contrary evidence to support its argument. Amnesty con-
cludes that evidence showing the Nordic model to be successful in reducing traf-
ficking is “not completely reliable” (Amnesty International, 2016b, p. 47). Indeed, 
it says, Sweden’s Chancellor of Justice himself has “confirmed” this (Amnesty In-
ternational, 2016b, p. 47). In the footnote, however, the chancellor’s actual quota-
tion fails to provide that confirmation; in fact, it contradicts Amnesty’s position 
regarding the Nordic model:  
Although it is hard to assess the exact scale of human trafficking for sex-
ual purposes, in Sweden the establishment of this kind of crime [traffick-
ing] is considered to be substantially smaller in scale than in other com-
parable countries. According to the Swedish police, it is clear that the ban 
on the purchase of sexual services acts as a barrier to human traffickers 
and procurers who are considering establishment in Sweden (Skarhead, 
2010, p. 34; Amnesty International, 2016b, p. 47).  
Focusing solely on the “hard to assess the exact scale” phrase—to the exclu-
sion of the point being made—Amnesty uses this quotation as its only evidence to 
7
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 back up its claim that numbers pointing to the Nordic model’s success in reduc-
ing trafficking are “not completely reliable” (Amnesty International, 2016b, p. 
47). Amnesty continues to claim that the Swedish National Council for Crime 
Prevention “found no evidence” that the Nordic model “significantly” “de-
creas[ed] trafficking into the sex industry in Sweden” (Amnesty, 2016b, p. 47 fn. 
250). Yet Amnesty’s page citation does not address that issue at all, and the refer-
enced report was focused on the organization of trafficking rather than the im-
pact of the Nordic model (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2008, 
p. 79).7 Further, other articles have referred to the data in the report, and com-
pared it to the trafficking numbers from comparable countries, to demonstrate 
that the Nordic model has reduced trafficking (Jakobsson & Kotsdam, 2010). 
It is telling that nothing in Amnesty’s Final Policy or Explanatory Note ad-
dresses the argument around why decriminalization of prostitution would in-
crease sex trafficking, namely, that demand will exceed supply. In order for sex 
trafficking not to increase, either (1) the supply must increase, or (2) the price 
must increase to balance demand with supply. First, supply increase: Some of 
this will be addressed in Section 3, but most women are not willing to sell or rent 
their bodies for sex, regardless of the price. Second, price increase. In an ideal 
market, the cost of “consensual” sex would simply increase until it causes supply 
and demand to reach equilibrium. But this requires an effective enforcement re-
gime to eliminate trafficking and forced prostitution (which can drive down pric-
es). Despite the fact that Amnesty consistently criticizes law enforcement and la-
ments the corruption and abuses by government and police, it still expects law 
enforcement to root out sex trafficking in a decriminalized market and ensure 
that the market works efficiently and fairly without any regulation. This is an 
enormous task. Further, prostitution primarily draws from unskilled (Moran, 
2013)8 and disadvantaged “workers” (see section 3), which increases the chance 
for an unregulated market to trigger a race-to-the-bottom (as we will see in Sec-
tion 4). 
There is also reason to think that Amnesty failed to meaningfully consider the 
concerns of sex trafficking victims. Amnesty touts the fact that it consulted with 
200 “sex workers” or “consenting” adults who actually have the capacity to “con-
sent” (Amnesty, 2016a; Amnesty, 2016b). What it fails to mention is telling: Am-
nesty did not seriously consult with sex-trafficking victims.9 Amnesty did not se-
riously consult with prostituted women who were coerced or pressured into sexu-
al exploitation. And Amnesty did not seriously consult with survivors of child sex 
trafficking or other victims of sexual exploitation. Amnesty consulted with “sex 
workers”—the part of the sex industry most likely to agree with its pre-conceived 
position. And Amnesty’s dismissal of the concerns and needs of victims of the sex 
industry goes even further. Amnesty recommends that “sex workers” be involved 
in developing any future legislation concerning the sex industry—only “sex work-
ers,” not sex-trafficking victims, not victims of sexual exploitation, and not vic-
tims of child sex trafficking, but only those adults who “consent” to the sale of 
                                                        
7 Page 79 of report focuses on the use of the internal organization of human trafficking rather than 
the impact of the law after implementation. 
8 Moran rebuts the notion of prostituted women as “skilled” workers. The main skill a prostituted 
woman possesses is the correct reproductive organs. Further, at times, johns and pimps specifically 
seek out “unskilled” and inexperienced women because they can get a better price (Moran, 2013). 
9 In its research, Amnesty only claimed to consult with five sex trafficking victims in two of the case 
studies discussed below (Amnesty, 2016d; Amnesty, 2016e). 
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 sex. Amnesty—instead of defending and giving a voice to voiceless—effectively 
recommends the silencing of those most harmed by the sex industry. And it does 
this all in the name of human rights. 
To conclude, the best available evidence indicates Amnesty’s policy will in-
crease sex trafficking. Amnesty dismisses the scholarly research that demon-
strates the risks of decriminalization, instead embracing an ill-founded ideology 
that holds that prostitution and sex trafficking are unrelated. In fact, prostitution 
and sex trafficking are part of same market—a market for sex—one that is likely 
to get only more brutal and exploitative if governments heed Amnesty’s recom-
mendations. We can now turn to what Amnesty means by “consensual” prostitu-
tion and whether even “consensual” prostitution is exploitative and abusive. 
 
THE MYTH OF CONSENT:  
“WORK” AND COMMERCIAL SEX ABUSE 
 
Amnesty reminds us often that “consent” is a “key component” of this “sex 
work” proposal, that “sex work” is limited to “consenting adults” (Amnesty, 
2016b, p. 26). Amnesty asserts that states must “recognize and respect the agency 
and capacity of adults engaged in consensual sex work” (Amnesty, 2016b, p. 27) 
and it objects to limitations on “agency” and “bodily autonomy” (Amnesty, 2016b, 
p. 27). The problem, it claims, is that government bodies and clients assume ei-
ther that “sex workers always consent to sex” or that “sex workers can never con-
sent to sex” (Amnesty, 2016a, p. 15; Amnesty, 2016b, p. 27). But Amnesty ignores 
a third option: Even when a “sex worker” consents to “sex,” she might still be a 
victim of exploitation. Unfortunately, people consent to exploitation and abuse all 
the time.  
Prostitution is not the same as sex trafficking, but it is an unjust form of ex-
ploitation. There are many situations in which people “consent” to abuse, and 
governments can have a legitimate role in preventing certain “consensual” but 
harmful activities, such as drunk driving and certain drug use. Further, based on 
“consent,” does Amnesty support the decriminalization of the sale of human or-
gans from live donors? After all, many people, driven by poverty, might consent 
to sell their organs, and there is already a black market for organs in certain 
countries. Does Amnesty favor allowing women to sell their bodies to be tor-
tured? Amnesty claims not to support violence against prostituted women—but 
under its “consent” analysis, there is no reason why it shouldn’t allow it. As dis-
cussed above, there is demand in the prostitution market for violence against 
women, and many desperate women already “consent” to undergo such abuse 
through BDSM and rape fantasies in the sex industry. In short, just because a 
prostituted woman “consents” to sell sex does not mean that it should be allowed 
or condoned, or that men should be allowed to buy or arrange it.  
The following will demonstrate that prostituted women are essentially con-
senting to their own exploitation and abuse, and that prostitution is exploita-
tive—even (and perhaps especially) when it is consented to. Further, our under-
standing of “consent” in most of these situations should be weighed against by 
the sex industry’s history of abuse and marginalization of women. 
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 Prostitution – Commercial Sex Abuse 
Almost all studies agree that prostitution is a remarkably violent and danger-
ous industry. One study of 854 prostituted women in nine countries found that 
63 percent of the women had been raped by a john or a pimp, and 71 percent had 
been physically assaulted (Farley et al, 2003). In Oregon, a study found that 84 
percent of prostituted women were victims of aggravated assault, 68 percent were 
victims of rape, 53 percent were victims of sexual torture, 49 percent had been 
kidnapped, and 27 percent had been mutilated by torture (Hunter, 1998). In San 
Francisco, a study of adults in prostitution discovered that 82 percent had been 
physically assaulted, 83 percent had been threatened with a weapon, and 68 per-
cent had been raped by a john or pimp (Ashley, 2008). In a study of prostitutes in 
seven cities in the U.S., 58 percent reported experiencing violence, while 36 re-
ported having abusive clients (Dank, 2014). Even Amnesty cites studies showing 
an industry fraught with sexual and physical violence, economic deprivation, and 
marginalization (Amnesty 2016a; Amnesty, 2016b). For example, Amnesty refers 
to a 2010 study in Papua New Guinea of 593 “sex workers.” In a period of six 
months, 46 percent had experienced physical violence and 50 percent had been 
raped (Amnesty, 2016c, p. 10).  
As a result of the regular sexual and physical violence, post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) and disassociation are common (Moran, 2013, p. 138-150). In 
one study, 68 percent of prostituted women suffered from PTSD, a number 
matched only by victims of state-sponsored torture and treatment-seeking com-
bat veterans (Farley et al, 2011). In a 30-year study of almost 2,000 prostitutes in 
the U.S., the most common causes of death were homicide, suicide, drug- and 
alcohol-related problems, HIV infection, and accidents (Patterat, 2004). The mor-
tality rate of prostitutes was found to be 200 times that of the general population 
(Patterat, 2004). Sixty-five percent had seriously attempted suicide, and 38 per-
cent had attempted it more than once (Hughes, 2004). Prostitution Research and 
Education concluded that prostituted women had a workplace homicide rate 51 
times the next most dangerous profession (Farley et al, 2011). 
Amnesty argues that certain types of prostitution are safer than others, and it 
relies heavily on various articles by Ronald Weitzer, a Professor of Sociology at 
George Washington University. Amnesty’s attempt to distinguish “good” versus 
“bad” prostitution fails for several reasons. First, the claim is not borne out by the 
evidence. Even studies of “good” prostitution show it to be a violent and danger-
ous business (MacKinnon, 2011; Scott, 2008). For instance, massage parlor pros-
titution is portrayed by Amnesty as less risky than street prostitution but even 
Weitzer cites a “survey of 100 Asian workers at 12 San Francisco massage parlors 
[that] found that 62% reported ever being beaten by a customer” (Weitzer, 2009, 
p. 219). In New Zealand, some legal brothels warn against having pillows in the 
rooms because of concerns that johns might suffocate the prostituted women 
(Moran, 2016). These are not indications of a healthy, risk-free work environ-
ment. 
Second, there is some evidence that indoor prostitution is actually more dan-
gerous than street prostitution. Some prostituted women have reported feeling 
less safe working in brothels and massage parlors because of a higher degree of 
isolation (Moran, 2016). The level of abuse can also be worse since indoor prosti-
tution mostly serves to protect the johns by providing anonymity (Farley, 2005). 
Third, Amnesty’s position relies on a Weitzer article that distorts the evi-
dence. In his heavily cited “Sociology of Sex Work,” Weitzer contends that indoor 
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 prostitution is less risky than street prostitution. To demonstrate his point, he 
creates a chart claiming that “brothel worker(s)” and “massage parlor worker(s)” 
face “Moderate” risk of “Exploitation by third parties” and “Very Low” “Risk of 
violent victimization” (Weitzer, 2009, p. 217). In contrast, street prostitution in-
volves “High” and “Very High” risks. Yet the chart is misleading. In the fine print, 
Weitzer explains that “the brothel and massage parlor workers depicted here do 
not include those who have been trafficked against their will or otherwise forced 
into prostitution” (Weitzer, 2009, p. 217) (emphasis added). In other words, he 
excludes those most at risk of “violent victimization” and “exploitation by third 
parties”—and only excludes them for indoor prostitution. He does not exclude 
those trafficked and coerced in street prostitution (Weitzer, 2009, p. 217). There-
by, Weitzer rigs the data to get the result he wants—and Amnesty willingly fol-
lows.  
What is clear is that all prostitution—indoors or on the street—carries large 
risks of violence and rape, and differing degrees of vulnerability. Prostitution is a 
necessarily risky and dangerous business. The violence and brutality inherent in 
the prostitution industry, if not in every single instance of prostitution, are why 
such a large percentage of prostituted women want to exit. In one study, 89 per-
cent of prostituted women said they wanted to escape (Farley et al, 2003). 
The violence in the prostitution industry should not be surprising. Contrary to 
Amnesty’s position, prostitution is distinct from other types of work because sex 
is different from other types of activities. This is also why rape is different from 
other forms of assault. Rape is commonly understood to be a particularly brutal 
and degrading crime. Though people can be forced to do many things without 
consent—they can be physically assaulted or forced to lift heavy objects, make 
sweaters, etc.—rape is worse because people recognize sex as especially intimate, 
personal, and private. This is why many prostituted women describe selling sex 
as, paradoxically, consenting to rape for money (Farley, 2005). It is a form of 
commercial sexual abuse because it involves dehumanizing and degrading one-
self. 
In study after study, prostituted women have discussed and reflected on this 
particular psychological harm of the sex industry. It is a common theme in many 
personal memoirs about the sex industry. As Moran notes, “What you are actually 
doing when you prostitute yourself is sanctioning and accepting payment for the 
sexual abuse of your own body. You go through all the negative feelings associat-
ed with sexual abuse, but in the sanction of it you have effectively gagged your-
self. You have literally sold your rights of expression; it is a twin prostitution real-
ly, and its second component is at least as damaging as the first” (Moran, 2013, p. 
107).  
So why would anyone choose to enter and stay in this industry, especially if 
aware of some of the risks? Why would someone “consent” to such dangers? 
Consenting to Abuse 
Amnesty’s proposal relies on a controversial understanding of consent. What 
counts as voluntary prostitution is highly contested. Most prostituted women en-
ter because of extreme desperation and a history of abuse that makes selling their 
body seem acceptable, even normal. Women’s “consent” to rent their bodies for 
further abuse must be understood in this context.  
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 Factors for entry 
We know that prostituted women are predominantly from disadvantaged, 
marginalized, and vulnerable communities. A large percentage of prostituted 
women have a history of abandonment, running away from home, and moving in 
and out of foster care and homeless shelters (Reid, 2011; Agnew, 1992; Wilson & 
Widom, 2010). We know that “prolonged and repeated trauma usually precedes 
entry into prostitution” (Farley et al, 2003, p. 35). Many prostituted women’s first 
sexual experience was rape, often by a family member or relative. In a pilot study 
of 130 prostitutes, 57 percent reported they had been sexually abused as a child, 
32 percent reported that rape was first their sexual experience, and 26 percent 
reported that their first sexual experience was with a relative (Farley & Barkan, 
1998). Another study found that 98 percent of prostitution survivors reported 
being emotionally abused as children, 90 percent had been physically abused, 85 
percent were victims of incest, and 60 percent had been sexually abused as chil-
dren (Farley & Kelly, 2000). And a different study found that 90 percent of the 
women had been physically battered in childhood; 74 percent had been sexually 
abused in their families, and another 50 percent also sexually abused by someone 
outside the family (Farley & Kelly, 2000). 
Women might also “choose” prostitution because of extreme poverty or desti-
tution, or to support a drug habit. While Amnesty tries to claim that prostitution 
is about making money, just like other forms of employment, this particular kind 
of “work” is usually only palatable because of poverty, a history of abuse and 
trauma, and desperation. In this sense, it is not different from many trafficking 
cases. We know that many sex-trafficking victims fail to understand that they are 
victims because of low-esteem, insecurity and brainwashing. Many trafficking 
victims are recruited through a sexual relationship, where the trafficker pretends 
to be a boyfriend and then leverages the victim’s feeling of love and attachment 
into commercial exploitation. As one pimp commented, it is a game of “choice, 
never by force” (GEMS, 2007; Geist, 2012). There is often a fine line between 
“consensual” prostitution and sex trafficking through coercion and fraud.  
Amnesty is, of course, correct that not every prostituted women has this expe-
rience, but the studies reveal that abuse, trauma, destitution, and desperation are 
the most common motivating factors in the industry. And this makes intuitive 
sense. If “sex workers” are subject to as much violence, stigma, and discrimina-
tion as even Amnesty concedes they are, only the most desperate are likely to 
choose prostitution as a profession. Still, Amnesty gives weight to the experiences 
of a few “sex workers”—casting “sex work” as normal, healthy, and even glamor-
ous—while forgetting the interests, and real situations, of the majority of prosti-
tuted women. It is possible that Amnesty is simply not concerned with causes of 
entry. Amnesty provides no real analysis of why women choose prostitution, ex-
cept to say that the reasons are varied. And yes, there are varied reasons, but it is 
rare to find a healthy reason. Amnesty even cites a United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) report so radical that it states, “Sex work is not always a desper-
ate or irrational act; it is a realistic choice to sell sex—in order to support a family, 
an education or maybe a drug habit” (Global Commission on HIV and the Law, 
2012, p. 39) (emphasis added). Selling oneself to feed a drug habit is an irrational 
act. And selling oneself to feed one’s children is a desperate act, albeit a noble 
one. But when we see a woman enter prostitution to provide for her children 
(Moran, 2013), rather than citing that as a reason to encourage prostitution, we 
should see it as an illustration of our society’s failure to provide for its most vul-
nerable members—and we should seek other solutions. Such a situation is but 
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 another indication of the perversion of the industry, and of the importance of of-
fering struggling mothers an alternative to subjecting themselves to trauma and 
exploitation. Amnesty’s embrace of the sex trade encourages an industry built on 
the physical and sexual abuse of mostly women. 
Average age of entry 
We also know that the age of entry into prostitution is very young. Most stud-
ies seem to indicate that the average age of entry is in the teenage years. The oft-
cited and oft-criticized (Hall, 2014) University of Pennsylvania report by Estes 
and Weiner puts the average of entry at 12-14 for girls and 11-13 for boys, but it 
was based on a small sample group and not intended as a generalization for all of 
prostitution (Estes & Weiner, 2001). But even some of the critiques of Estes et al 
put the age of entry around 15 to 16 (Har, 2013; Conner, 2016). And similar re-
sults to Estes and Weiner’s have been found in other states. Studies in Illinois 
and Washington also put the age of entry at 12-14 (Boyer et al, 1993), and a Chi-
cago study found 35 percent entering prostitution before 15 and 62 percent be-
fore 18 (Raphael & Shapiro, 2002). A New York study said the average age of en-
try was 15 (Curtis et al, 2008; Silbert & Pines, 1982), and an international study 
of nine countries found 47 percent entered prostitution before 18 (Farley et al, 
2003). In short, the best evidence available indicates that the average age of entry 
into prostitution is under 18. 
These studies cast the sex industry in a troubling light, as depending on the 
commercialized rape of children. Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
(TVPA) and international law—and under Amnesty’s own standard—these are vic-
tims of sex trafficking. The commercial sexual exploitation of minors is by defini-
tion sex trafficking. Human trafficking numbers also show the frequency of sex 
trafficking of minors. For example, according to a 2011 Department of Justice 
(DOJ) report, nearly half of the year’s 2,500 federal sex-trafficking cases involved 
victims under 18 (Banks & Kyckelhahn, 2011). Amnesty’s policy asks us to believe 
that, if an underage girl has been trafficked for sex, on her eighteenth birthday 
she becomes a consenting adult in the “sex work”—this despite the disadvantages 
placed on her by her years of victimization in the industry. Overnight, that child’s 
rapists and sex traffickers become legitimate “sex work” customers and organiz-
ers. In reality, prostitution is an industry that offers and relies on a steady supply 
of traumatized, exploited, marginalized, and disadvantaged women and children 
to be sold, on the cheap, to men. 
Given the troubling implications of why people “consent” to become “sex 
workers,” Amnesty would have good reason to rebut the research on average age 
of entry. So how does Amnesty address this evidence in its final policy? In all, 
Amnesty devotes one footnote to it. Footnote 34 reads: “[C]laims that the majori-
ty of sex workers enter the sex industry as children . . . have been shown to be 
misrepresentative of a large proportion of sex workers” (Amnesty, 2016a, p. 9 fn. 
34). To support this position, Amnesty cites three articles—two of which do not 
discuss average age of entry (Vanweseneeck, 2001; Clatt et al, 2014), and Ronald 
Weitzer’s “Sociology of Sex Work” addresses it in only three paragraphs (Weitzer, 
2009, p. 219). Weitzer states, “Regarding age of entry, it is sometimes claimed 
that 13-14 years old is the norm, but this appears to be a myth” (Weitzer, 2009, p. 
219). And Weitzer offers one citation to support this claim—Winick and Kinsie, 
from 1971 (Weitzer, 2009, p. 219; Winick & Kinsie, 1971). In other words, Weit-
zer’s (and Amnesty's) rejection of an entire body of research about average age of 
entry is based on one citation to an article in 1971—an article that predates most 
of the relevant research by three decades. 
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 After casually dismissing the prior research, Weitzer proceeds to discuss two 
studies. He explains, “[O]ne recent study of street prostitutes found that 20% be-
gan to sell before age 16 and that “almost half (48%) had entered after age 19” 
(Weitzer, 2009, p. 219). What Weitzer does not spell out is that the study’s find-
ings mean that 52 percent entered before 19 years of age (Hester & Westmarland, 
2004), and the study said that prostituted women entered at a “young” age (Hes-
ter & Westmarland, 2004, p. 77). The other study found that only three percent of 
call girls and four percent of brothel workers entered prostitution between the 
ages of 12 and 15, and that the majority entered after age 19 (Weitzer, 2009, p. 
219). But Weitzer does not mention that the study, conducted in Australia, fo-
cused on call girls from Sydney and Canberra who are described as middle-class 
“sex workers” (meaning they are more likely to have a later age of entry) (Perkins 
& Lovejoy, 2007), and while the Estes et al. study has been criticized for using a 
sample of only 210, the sample of call girls (95) was even smaller (with a sample 
of 124 brothel workers used as a comparison) (Perkins & Lovejoy, 2007). Yet 
Weitzer accepts this study as truth while dismissing others out of hand. 
Amnesty’s entire argument against all the evidence that prostituted women 
enter the industry at a young age is based on the following: an article from 1971—
a study that focuses mostly on a small sample of call girls from Sydney and Can-
berra; and a study that disagrees with Amnesty and concludes that “street prosti-
tutes” enter at a “young” age, many as children.  
Amnesty International’s Free Market Utopia 
Amnesty could claim that even if prostitution is exploitative and abusive, 
people have a right to consent to it. And even if that consent is given due to trau-
ma and abuse, it is still someone’s right to give that consent; therefore, the gov-
ernment has no regulatory role to play. Yet this economic libertarian outlook 
would certainly be an outlier for a leftist human rights group. Governments typi-
cally have wide berth in regulating economic activity in order to prohibit such 
things as child labor, highly dangerous activities, and overly long working hours. 
Amnesty has traditionally cheered regulations to protect workers, but it does not 
support regulations to protect “workers” in the sex industry. Amnesty’s conver-
sion to free-market idealism applies only to the most dangerous and violent in-
dustry. 
 Amnesty also ignores the other actors in all this: the men who are abusing 
and exploiting vulnerable and marginalized women. It is one thing to excuse 
someone for hurting herself (as troubling as that is), but it quite another story to 
excuse those who are hurting her. Someone always benefits from a prostituted 
woman’s history of abuse by purchasing or renting her for his own pleasure and 
amusement; someone did the abusing, raping, beating, and torturing of that 
prostituted woman. Yet Amnesty wants to protect pimps and johns from criminal 
sanctions, and even from regulations. Amnesty wants prostitution in an unregu-
lated market, even though it is an especially risky industry fraught with physical 
and sexual violence, frequently entailing the commercialized rape of children, 
and benefiting from a workforce that has a history of trauma. This policy only 
compounds the exploitation of prostituted women. As Moran put it, “To be pros-
tituted is humiliating enough; to legalise prostitution is to condone that humilia-
tion, and to absolve those who inflict it. It is an agonising insult” (Moran, 2013, 
221). 
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 “GIRLS ARE FOR SALE”: AMNESTY’S UNREGULATED,  
OPEN MARKET FOR WOMEN’S BODIES 
 
Girls Education and Mentoring Service (GEMS)—an organization in New York 
that helps empower victims of commercial sexual exploitation—has a campaign 
called “Girls Are Not For Sale.” Amnesty International flips that on its head: Girls 
Are For Sale. Amnesty’s recommendations would only make worse a prostitution 
industry already defined by physical and sexual violence. Amnesty does not deny 
that prostitution can be brutal; rather, it believes that prostituted women are 
made more vulnerable to abuse and exploitation by criminal penalties. It con-
tends that if prostitution were decriminalized, then prostituted women could re-
port violence and rapes to the police and get access to health care. But Amnesty 
offers scant evidence for any of this in its Final Policy and Explanatory Note. In-
stead, Amnesty focuses on how criminalization can be counter-productive and 
cause problems, critiquing the Nordic model as well. But showing that these ap-
proaches are imperfect does not prove that decriminalization is better.  
Amnesty conducted four in-depth country case studies, none of which in-
volved a country that has legalized or decriminalized prostitution. An honest ap-
praisal of how to approach prostitution would have assessed an example of crim-
inalization, decriminalization, legalization, and a hybrid such as the Nordic mod-
el. Instead, Amnesty only studied and critiqued—in many cases, rightly so—the 
problems with criminalization and the Nordic model. These critiques are im-
portant and necessary, but Amnesty failed to take a serious look at the results of 
decriminalization and legalization. This left Amnesty free to criticize other mod-
els without putting its own (or the closest comparison to its own) under the mi-
croscope. Further, Amnesty used Norway as a case study for the Nordic model 
but did not examine Sweden, which developed the Nordic model and has seen 
good results. During its in-country consultations, Amnesty again did not serious-
ly include sex-trafficking victims or prostituted children in the conversation, and 
instead consulting primarily with those who qualify as “sex workers” in Amnes-
ty’s narrow definition. In Papua New Guinea, Amnesty consulted with 29 “sex 
workers” and no victims of sex trafficking (Amnesty, 2016c, p. 9). In Hong Kong, 
Amnesty consulted with 40 “key stakeholders” including “sex workers” but not 
including victims of sex trafficking (Amnesty, 2016d, p. 10). In Argentina, Amnes-
ty consulted with 13 “sex workers” and two victims of sex trafficking (Amnesty, 
2016e, p. 13). In Norway, Amnesty consulted with 27 “sex workers” and three vic-
tims of sex trafficking (Amnesty, 2016f, p. 8). Amnesty did not claim to have con-
sulted with any child victims of prostitution. 
When we do what Amnesty failed to do and actually look at attempts of legali-
zation and decriminalization, we find that the theoretical benefits did not materi-
alize. Decriminalization further opens the door to abuse and exploitation, causes 
a race to the bottom, and reduces access to protection and health care. 
Opening the Door to More Abuse and Exploitation 
Decriminalization causes a race to the bottom in the sex industry. The grow-
ing demand for sex is met through more trafficking, increased immigration from 
predominantly poor countries (such as Eastern Europe) (Koprs Landelijke Poli-
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 tiediensten, 2008; TAMPEP, 2009),10 and prostitutes being “worked” even hard-
er. Already marginalized and vulnerable prostituted women gain even less bar-
gaining power in an open market, and men are effectively encouraged to demand 
more as the legal regime lifts any stigma or restraints on the types of sexual ser-
vices being provided. In New Zealand, women in brothels have reported that 
“men now demand more than ever for less than ever. And because the trade is 
socially sanctioned, there is no incentive for the government to provide exit strat-
egies for those who want to get out of it. These women are trapped” (Moran, 
2015). In Germany, women reported working 18-hour days and living in the 
rooms in which they worked—hardly a healthy environment (Winter, 2010; Diu, 
2015).11  Germany now features massive 12-story brothels to service men around 
the clock. 12  Advertisements in Germany include: “Sex with all women as long as 
you want, as often as you want and the way you want. Sex. Anal sex. Oral sex 
without a condom. Three-ways. Group sex. Gang bangs” (Meyer et al, 2013). 
 As mentioned before, most prostituted women want to escape the indus-
try. Decriminalizing prostitution, however, will reduce the pressure to provide 
exit and escape options; once “sex work” is officially considered to be the same as 
other professions, why would there be a need to help women escape it? It will also 
reduce pressure to provide victims of prostitution with the requisite health care, 
counseling and aid to help them rebuild their lives.  
Reducing Stigma and Reducing Protection 
Amnesty frees johns and pimps from criminal scrutiny and regulation, and it 
frees law enforcement and government agencies from their obligation to help the 
victims of prostitution. This leaves prostituted women with less access to social 
services and protection than before, and emboldens their exploiters. Decriminali-
zation of prostitution will make it harder for police to intervene to stop human 
trafficking and violence in the industry.  
First, Amnesty’s proposal sends the wrong message to law enforcement and 
social services agencies. One of the great successes of the anti-trafficking move-
ment has been pushing back against the presumption of “consent” in prostitu-
tion, demonstrating that many women are prostituted as a result of force, fraud, 
or coercion. This opened the door for victims of prostitution to receive aid and 
protection. Amnesty, instead, will feed the myth of the “happy prostitute” (Mo-
                                                        
10 For instance, in the Netherlands, the percentage of Dutch prostitutes has declined from 95 per-
cent to around 10 percent, and of the foreign born prostitutes, around 70 percent are undocument-
ed. Ninety percent of women in Amsterdam’s brothels are East European, African, and Asian wom-
en (Koprs Landelijke Politiediensten, 2008). Other studies have put the numbers lower; for in-
stance, TAMPEP put the number at around 60 percent. Foreign-born women are more vulnerable 
to exploitation and abuse (TAMPEP, 2009). 
11 Doris Winter, a former prostitute using a pseudonym wrote in a contribution to the Academic 
series, “Today a higher percentage of prostitutes don’t go home after work, but rather remain at 
their place of work around the clock… The women usually live in the rooms where they work.” 
Working conditions for prostitutes have “worsened in recent years… Significantly more services are 
provided under riskier conditions for less money than 10 years ago” (Winter, 2010). 
12 Now it is worth noting that some of the previous examples are from legalization models, such as 
Germany. But while legalization and decriminalization are different, they are likely to play out in 
similar ways. Decriminalization of anything will be worse, because of even fewer restrictions on 
men and fewer safety regulations (such as panic buttons, background checks for clients, requiring a 
client registry with safety reviews, requiring condoms or regular health checks for prostituted wom-
en and/or clients, licensing for pimps or organizers). Decriminalization removes even the minimal 
protections offered in legalization, and leaves prostituted women even more vulnerable to abuse. 
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 ran, 2016, p. 90, 150), which will reduce governmental and non-governmental 
focus on prostitution. It takes a considerable degree of naiveté to think that pros-
tituted women will receive more help and protection if they are seen as “workers” 
in a tough but fulfilling job instead of as victims of abuse. 
Second, stigma around “sex work” will be primarily reduced for pimps and 
johns, not for “sex workers.” Amnesty displays remarkable hypocrisy by criticiz-
ing police for corruption and abuse of “sex workers” yet, on the other hand, 
thinking that police will prevent violence after being told that “sex workers” are 
not victims but normal employees. It does nothing to disabuse police or society at 
large of the conception that—even if legal—“sex work” is “dirty” or degrading, 
which will make it harder for “sex workers” to report abuses and seek recourse. 
Third, as previously explained, prostituted women will be more vulnerable to 
sex traffickers, pimps, and other sexual predators. Police will be more likely to 
view physical and sexual violence as part of these women’s “work” (which it often 
is) to be dealt with as contract disputes rather than serious crimes. 
Unfortunately, we already see some of this playing out. In 2007, the German 
government found that there “are no viable indications that the [legalization of 
prostitution] has reduced crime” and that legalization “has as yet contributed on-
ly very little in terms of improving transparency in the world of prostitution” 
(German Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, 2007). Over one-third of prosecu-
tors noted that legalizing prostitution “made their work in prosecuting trafficking 
in human beings and pimping more difficult” (German Federal Ministry for Fam-
ily Affairs, 2007). The report also stated that the law has “not been able to make 
actual, measureable improvements to prostitutes’ social protection,” “hardly any 
measureable, positive impact has been observed” regarding their working condi-
tions, and that there are “no viable indications that the [law] has reduced crime” 
(German Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, 2007, p. 79). The Dutch govern-
ment noted that “a large part of police capacity was used for inspections in the 
regulated sector [of prostitution], leaving them with no capacity to play a major 
monitoring and investigative role with regard to punishable forms of prostitution 
outside the licensed businesses” (i.e., the illegal sector) (Daalder, 2002). In New 
Zealand, the police noted that “as a result of legislative changes, Police . . . [have] 
less contact with the sex industry, and there is no systematic intelligence gather-
ing and collation,” making it more difficult to discover abuses and exploitation 
(New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 2008, p. 101). According to the New Zealand 
government report, “the majority of sex workers interviewed felt that the [act of 
decriminalizing prostitution] could do little about violence that occurred” in the 
sex industry (New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 2008, p. 14). Prostituted women 
also reported that they were not more likely than they were before decriminaliza-
tion to report acts of violence they suffered to the police (New Zealand Ministry 
of Justice, 2008, p. 58). One-third of those working in legal brothels stated that 
they had to have sex with a client they didn’t want to in the last year (New Zea-
land Ministry of Justice, 2008, p. 46). 
The Right to Health 
A large part of Amnesty’s argument is framed as concerning prostituted 
women’s right to health, but Amnesty actually devotes very little analysis to this 
question in the Final Policy and Explanatory Note. In fact, the bulk of its research 
comes from various UN agencies focused on HIV/AIDs (Global Commission on 
HIV and the Law, 2012; WHO, 2012; UNAIDS, 2009, Human Rights Council, 
2010), instead of experts in prostitution and sex trafficking. Those experts largely 
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 objected to Amnesty’s proposal, including the concerns laid out in the Coalition 
Against Trafficking in Women’s (CATW) open letter (CATW, 2015)—signed by 600 
organizations and individuals—or those in the open letter of Jessica Neuwirth, 
who founded Equality Now and Amnesty’s Women Rights Division (Neuwirth, 
2014). These parties understand that health care policy needs to be crafted in a 
particular way to deal with the specific risks and hazards innate to prostitution 
and sex trafficking, and to the wide range of health concerns that cannot be re-
duced to only HIV/AIDs—but Amnesty has not shown interest in their expertise in 
these matters (Bien-Aime, 2015; Geist, 2016). 
Because the sex industry is likely to get more exploitative after decriminaliza-
tion due to the race to the bottom and increased trafficking, prostituted women 
will have less access to health care and services. The increased demands of clients 
will also have a health cost. This could be from increasingly violent clients, re-
quests for unprotected sex, more frequent anal sex, or simply the physical (and 
psychological toll) of being penetrated multiple times every day by, in most cases, 
strangers. Some of these health concerns could be dealt with through a legaliza-
tion regime, but basic health regulations, like requiring condoms, caps on the 
number of clients per day, and STD checks of clients, are not part of Amnesty’s 
proposal; quite the opposite, in fact. Further, all the benefits of decriminaliza-
tion—such as greater willingness to go to hospitals—could be met through the 
Nordic model. 
Country studies have demonstrated this. Even Germany and New Zealand, 
the two cases studies usually held up as most favorable to Amnesty’s position, 
saw no improvement in health care for prostitutes after decriminalization (Ger-
man Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, 2007, p. 16-20; New Zealand Ministry of 
Justice, 2008, p. 49-50). In fact, because of the increase in trafficking and wors-
ening conditions, the health care situation is likely to worsen. In Germany, hardly 
any women in prostitution registered with a social insurance agency as employ-
ees, and thus the vast majority of them were not afforded greater social protec-
tion and benefits like health insurance and pension insurance (German Federal 
Ministry for Family Affairs, 2007, p. 16-20). In New Zealand, according to the 
government, most people in prostitution “felt there had been no great change” in 
their access to health services and information since decriminalization, and key 
informants “were not aware of any substantial change in the use of safer sex prac-
tices by sex workers as a result of the enactment of [the law that decriminalized 
prostitution]” (New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 2008, p. 49-50). In contrast, 
Sweden, using the Nordic model, has used money from fines against pimps and 
johns to expand health care and services provided to prostituted women. The re-
sult of Amnesty’s promise of the right to health will be prostituted women who 
are less healthy and more vulnerable to abuse. 
 
CONCLUSION 
“Being with a prostitute is like having a cup of coffee, when you’re done, 
you throw it out.” (Farley et al.,  2011) 
There is a myth that prostitution is a victimless crime. But it is not. The pros-
tituted women are victims of commercial sex abuse, and are usually in the indus-
try because of a history of exploitation, abuse, and poverty. There are also the vic-
tims of sex trafficking and prostituted children who are caught in the same sex 
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 industry. And Amnesty’s decriminalization proposal is harmful not just to prosti-
tuted women. It also contributes to a pervasive rape culture by feeding the idea 
that it is acceptable to treat people, to treat women, as objects to be bought, sold, 
used and abused. It teaches men and women that sex is not unique and special 
and, hence, that rape is not especially wrong.  
Decriminalization will reduce the stigma and risks associated with purchasing 
and arranging sex, and thereby reduce the stigma of using someone else without 
concern for their overall well-being. Men will be free to demand more from wom-
en, and will feel entitled to purchase women’s bodies. Here, the connection be-
tween pornography and prostitution is illustrative. Over time, pornography has 
become progressively more extreme, and pornography is a training ground for 
prostitution (Farley et al, 2011). Pornography helps develop male fantasies, and 
then johns seek to act out those fantasies—often involving BDSM, barely legal 
teens, public humiliation, and rape—with prostituted women (Farley et al, 2011; 
Janson, 2013). Several studies indicates that de-stigmatizing the commodifica-
tion of sex contributes to johns becoming even more aggressive and violent to-
ward prostitutes (Farley et al, 2011; Janson, 2013). A recent study found that men 
who buy sex have less empathy for women and are at greater risk for committing 
sexual violence (Wolper, 2015).  
Amnesty, again, comes to the defense of johns, attempting to promote a dis-
tinction between “good” and “bad” clients. But if “good” men are using prostitut-
ed women, then the policy should be not to de-stigmatize “sex work,” but to edu-
cate them about the violence in the industry and the desperation that drives most 
prostituted women to this work. They should be taught to respect women as per-
sons rather than as objects to be bought, used, and discarded. Instead, Amnesty 
continues to seduce men with the idea that prostitution is a victimless crime, al-
lowing them to be complicit in a system of violence and exploitation. In the name 
of women’s rights, Amnesty panders to the worst in men instead of demanding 
the best in them. 
Amnesty is right about at least one thing. The laws on prostitution are in des-
perate need of reform. But those reforms should be aimed at offering an alterna-
tive to prostitution for all the people trapped in the industry. They should offer 
protection from pimps, johns, and, at times, law enforcement, and they should 
serve to educate people about the violence and degradation that take place within 
the sex industry. Instead, Amnesty’s policy will increase human trafficking by 
normalizing and effectively condoning the sex trade. It will facilitate the commer-
cial sexual abuse of women by contributing to a race to the bottom in the sex in-
dustry. And its proposed reforms will protect and encourage pimps and johns at 
the expense of the victims of the sex industry. Amnesty claims that its policy will 
protect the human rights of sex workers, but it will do the opposite.  And the sex 
trafficking victims and child prostitutes—largely ignored in the policy and ex-
cluded in the recommendations—will be left even more vulnerable to abuse and 
exploitation. Amnesty’s policy on decriminalization promises to protect the hu-
man rights of prostituted women, but in reality, it only offers support and defense 
to a sex industry built on violence and sexual exploitation.  
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